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 
Abstract—Credit ratings have assumed an increasingly 
formidable and important role over the years. An increased role and 
revisions to its foundations, have been triggered, not only in view 
of the shortcomings of credit ratings based criteria, as revealed 
through the recent Financial Crisis, but also the need to update 
Basel II - which has served as the foundation for credit ratings in 
several jurisdictions. Credit ratings serve various vital purposes, 
most notably of which include the determination of capital 
requirements, the identification and classification of assets, and the 
provision of reliable estimation and assessment of credit risk. 
The criteria required to be satisfied by credit rating agencies, 
namely: objectivity, independence, transparency, disclosure, 
resources and credibility, are closely linked, since the level of 
comparability and consistency of information provided by such 
agencies, also serves as a useful indicator that such information is 
reliable and credible. 
In response to the changing financial environment - the 
evolution and emergence of new and more complex forms of risks 
and financial products, credit rating agencies have extended their 
scope beyond 
the coverage of their traditional products. As well as assessing 
whether the scope of products presently covered by rating agencies 
could be deemed adequately relevant to the criteria required to 
satisfy 
information being provided as credible, this paper also addresses 
the reliability of credit scoring methods and models. Are those 
measures used in estimating the probability of default, namely, 
financial statements, market prices of a firm’s debt and equity, and 
appraisals of the firm’s prospects and risk sufficiently indicative as 
to provide a reliable estimate of the firm's probability of default? 
The reliability and consistency of credit ratings across different 
jurisdictions, sectors - financial, non financial sectors, and rating 
agencies, as well as the reliability of the approach for assessing 
ratings constitute major areas to be addressed. This is in part, 
attributed to the difficulties with achieving a balance between risk-
sensitivity and comparability. 
The Basel III leverage ratios also being crucial to achieving an 
acceptable balance with risk-sensitivity - such that the capital 
framework is not considered unduly risk-sensitive - as was the case 
with Basel II. 
The increased importance attributed to credit ratings is also 
reflected by the Basel Committee’s recent introduction of the 
Standardized Approach (SA-CCR) for measuring exposure at 
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default (EAD) for counter-party credit risk (CCR). The SA-CCR is 
intended to replace both current non-internal models approaches, 
the Current Exposure Method (CEM) and the Standardized Method 
(SM). The SA-CCR will apply to OTC derivatives, exchange-traded 
derivatives and long settlement transactions. Risk models have 
certainly become increasingly complex and relevant - however, is 
such level of complexity correspondingly and adequately balanced 
with the level of objectivity and comparability which is required 
within the capital framework? 
 
Keywords— credit ratings, OTC derivatives, objectivity, risk 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
HE criteria required to be satisfied by credit rating 
agencies, as a means of generating high quality external 
credit assessments, namely[1]: objectivity, 
independence, transparency, disclosure, resources and 
credibility, are closely linked, since the comparability of 
information provided by such agencies also serves as a useful 
indicator that such information is reliable and credible. 
However these criteria – and particularly that relating to 
objectivity, have been called into question recently. 
This has been triggered by the changing financial 
environment - as well as the evolution and emergence of new 
and more complex forms of risks and financial products. 
Correspondingly, credit rating agencies have responded by 
extending their scope beyond the coverage of their traditional 
products. 
The uses of credit ratings, according to the Joint Forum, 
include the following [2]: 
- the determination of capital requirements; 
- the identification or classification of assets; 
- the provision of credible valuation of credit risk; 
- the determination of disclosure requirements; and 
- the determination of prospectus eligibility 
Revisions and Adjustments Undertaken By the Basel 
Committee to Improve the Effectiveness of Measures of 
Bank's Resilience to Financial Crises. 
Out of the five indicators of a bank's strength, as reflected 
by the CAMEL[3] system, efforts made in relation to capital 
adequacy requirements will constitute the focus of this paper. 
Hence the ensuing section, section II, commences with an 
introduction to the Standardized Approach for Measuring 
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Counter Party Credit Risk – as well as developments which 
have culminated in its introduction – namely the gaps 
identified with Basel II, and the need to sufficiently account 
for previously unquantified volatile transactions and risks. 
The quality of information provided by credit ratings, as well 
as the role of credit ratings agencies in addressing 
asymmetric information will constitute one of those issues to 
be addressed under section III. In view of the ever increasing 
significance of risks in financial and regulatory 
environments, as well as the need to quantify and regulate 
such risks, should the quality of audits and the role assumed 
by audits not be factored into credit ratings processes? The 
role of audits in the capital markets of several major 
economies and their significance in verifying and facilitating 
credible, reliable and accurate information and signals within 
capital markets have been discussed extensively in the 
literature. Section IV highlights why audits and auditors have 
assumed such a vital role within an increasingly risk based 
regulatory environment. Section V then concludes by 
focusing on one of the themes of the paper – namely the need 
to balance the level of complexity, objectivity and 
comparability which is required within the capital 
framework. In view of considerable regulatory, audit and 
accounting differences which persist across jurisdictions, 
could credit ratings based criteria really be considered to be 
adequately objective? Furthermore, given the crucial role 
assumed by external auditors in the regulatory and 
supervisory process, as well as their prominence within the 
Basel Committee's Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision, should this fundamental issue not constitute a 
greater focus for redress in emerging economies? Will recent 
efforts by the Committee to address capital adequacy and 
leverage ratios be undermined since an underlying issue has 
still not been addressed in several emerging economies? Are 
those emerging economies who are concerned justified in 
their reluctance to adequately embrace audits – based on 
cost- benefit considerations? These are amongst some of the 
points which this paper will seek to address. 
II.   THE STANDARDIZED APPROACH FOR MEASURING 
COUNTER PARTY CREDIT RISK (SA-CCR)  
, 
The Standardized Approach for Measuring Counter Party 
Credit Risk (SA-CCR) replaces both current non-internal 
model approaches – the Current Exposure Method (CEM) 
and the Standardized Method (SM). Efforts aimed at 
ensuring that volatile transactions are captured – as well as 
previously unaccounted for risks, are evidenced by the 
following rationales for introducing the SA-CCR and the 
criticisms attributed to the previously existing non- internal 
model approaches – which include the fact[4]: 
- That the Current Exposure Method, did not, in particular, 
distinguish between margined and un margined 
transactions; 
- That the supervisory add-on factor did not sufficiently 
capture the level of volatilities as observed over recent 
stress periods, and the recognition of netting was too 
simplistic and not reflective of economically meaningful 
relationships between derivatives positions;  
- That the Standardized Method, even though more risk-
sensitive than the Current Exposure Method, did not 
differentiate between margined and un margined 
transactions or sufficiently capture the level of volatilities 
observed over stress periods in the last five years. Further, 
given the inability to implement the Standardized Method, 
or implementing it inconsistently. 
- The relationship between current exposure and potential 
future exposure (PFE) was misrepresented in the 
Standardized Method because only current exposure or 
PFE was capitalized. 
- Finally, the Standardized Method did not provide banks 
with a true non-internal model alternative for calculating 
EAD because the Standardized Method used internal 
methods for computing delta-equivalents for non-linear 
transactions. 
The Second Consultative Paper, issued by the Basel 
Committee in January 2001, introduced the two Internal 
Ratings Based (IRB) methodologies – the Foundational IRB 
and the Advanced IRB methodologies. The Internal Ratings 
Based approach to capital requirements for credit risk, not 
only relies significantly on the internal assessment carried out 
by a bank, in relation to counterparties and exposures, but is 
also geared towards the achievement of two primary goals, 
namely[5]: „additional risk sensitivity“ and „incentive 
compatibility“. 
Basel II is premised on a three level approach which 
permits banks to select from three models, namely: the basic 
standardized model, the IRB foundation approach and the 
advanced ratings approach. 
According to the Consultative Document on Standard 
Approach to Credit Risk,[6] capital requirements under the 
standardized approach are considered to be more 
synchronized and in harmony with the principal elements of 
banking risk – owing to the introduction of more 
differentiated risk weights and a broader recognition of 
techniques which are applied in mitigating risk whilst such 
techniques attempt to avoid undue complexity. As a result, 
capital ratios generated through the standardized approach, 
should adapt more to present and actual risks encountered by 
banks, than was the case previously. 
Under Pillar One minimum capital requirements, 
operational risk is to be corroborated by capital. 
Measurement approaches for operational risk can be found in 
the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) and there are 
three broad approaches to the capital assessment of 
operational risk which are as follows: 
- Basic Indicator Approaches 
- Standardized Approaches 
- Internal Measurement Approach 
Basel II constitutes the foundation for credit ratings in 
several jurisdictions. However, failures and flaws of Basel II, 
as revealed during the recent Financial Crisis have prompted 
revisions, which have been made to the framework for 
determining capital requirements for bank exposures to 
central 
counterparties – as introduced through a new section (Section 
XI) of Annex 4 of the International Convergence of Capital 
  
Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework 
– Comprehensive Version, June 2006 (hereinafter referred to 
as “Basel II”)[7]. 
 Exposures to central counterparties arising from OTC 
derivatives, exchange-traded derivatives transactions, SFTs 
and long settlement transactions are to be subject to the 
counterparty credit risk treatment laid out in paragraphs 188 
to 211 of the Annex (Section XI) of Annex 4 )[8]. Exposures 
arising from the settlement of cash transactions (equities, 
fixed income, spot FX and spot commodities) are not 
subject to this treatment[9]. 
Within the Basel II framework, external ratings are used 
for the purpose of enhancing the risk sensitivity of the 
framework[10]. They are not only primarily used under the 
standardized approach for credit risk, but also apply to risk-
weight securitizations exposures - the different uses of 
external ratings corresponding to probability of default 
treatments under the standardized approaches, and to 
situations where the use of internally generated ratings is 
impossible or difficult given, for instance, the lack of 
statistical data for securitized products[11]. 
According to the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, the traditional rating agency product is „an 
assessment of the credit quality of individual debt issues of a 
firm.”[12] In recognition of the changing financial 
environment, as well as more complex risks associated with 
financial products, in recent years, rating agencies have 
expanded their coverage to other debt products and have 
introduced variants or refinements of their traditional 
products. Despite efforts made by rating agencies to adapt to 
changes in the financial environment, their credit scoring 
methods, approaches and models, and the reliability of these 
– particularly measures based on market prices, may still be 
questioned. As is the case with the inability of capital 
adequacy ratios and measures, on their own, to provide 
adequately reliable indication of a bank's strength, robustness 
and resilience – particularly during periods of financial 
downturns, information provided by credit rating agencies 
should not be relied upon as being sufficient in their entirety. 
Just as liquidity and leverage ratios had to be introduced 
through Basel III to complement the risk-based capital 
adequacy framework for the inadequacies and flaws revealed 
during the recent Financial Crisis, there is need for closer 
collaboration between supervisory agencies, financial 
institutions, credit rating agencies as well as external auditors 
in order to maximize the benefits of those synergies arising 
from such a collaboration. 
III. IS INFORMATION PROVIDED THROUGH CREDIT RATINGS 
AGENCIES SUPERIOR TO THOSE OF MACRO ECONOMIC 
INDICATORS? 
 This appears to a jurisdictional based question. 
  “The recent crisis highlighted the interface between, and 
the complementary nature of, the macro prudential and Micro 
prudential elements of effective supervision. In their 
application of a risk-based supervisory approach, supervisors 
and other authorities need to assess risk in a broader context 
than that of the balance sheet of individual banks“ [13]. 
A distinction of the two categories assumed by credit 
ratings is required in order to facilitate the understanding of 
their role in impacting financial markets. 
Credit ratings can be classified into two: 
- Investment grade designation 
- Speculative grade designation 
Various studies have associated and concluded on the 
basis that investment grade classes are often associated with 
lower spreads. According to a study undertaken by Jaramillo 
and Tejada, the investment grade designation reduces 
spreads significantly - „by 36 percent above and beyond what 
is implied by macroeconomic fundamentals.“[14] Further, as 
indicated in their investigation, empirical studies have, on the 
whole, discovered that better ratings are associated with 
lower spreads[15]. 
Three basic types of information which are usually 
employed as a means of determining an enterprise' 
probability of default are[16]: financial statements, market 
prices of a firm’s debt and equity, and subjective appraisals 
of the firm’s prospects and risk. 
Audits constitute vital signaling mechanisms in capital 
markets – thus serving as crucial indicators to financial 
investors of the worth of the enterprise or firm which is being 
invested in or which may be potentially invested in. In view 
of the  fundamental informational role assumed by audits in 
many industrial nations, it could be easily deduced that credit 
rating agencies would play less fundamental informational 
roles in these nations than in emerging economies. However 
such a role is based on the reliance on information provided 
by such agencies – and not the impact of downgrading or 
upgrading 
credit ratings. The severe consequences of downgrading any 
country's credit ratings – regardless of whether such a nation 
is an emerging economy or an industrial nation cannot be 
over-emphasized. 
From such a perspective, the impact of downgrading or 
upgrading a nation's credit ratings is distinguished from 
credit agencies' roles or significance in providing reliable, 
credible and timely information. 
Two opposing views regarding the worth and 
informational value of credit ratings have been put forward 
by Kräussl [17]: 
The first view: 
- That credit agencies only have access to publicly available 
information and that these agencies lag behind financial 
markets in processing such information. Further, Kräussl 
adds that credit rating changes should not affect market 
prices if financial markets are efficient in semi-strong 
form. 
The opposing view not only argues that credit rating 
agencies are „specialists in obtaining and processing 
information“, but that sovereign credit changes, as well as 
negative credit ratings announcements are likely to generate 
more significant impacts in emerging markets – owing to the 
level of severity of problems attributed to asymmetric 
information and transparency. 
Why Credit Ratings Serve a Greater Role in Emerging 
Economies than Industrial Nations 
  
It has been argued in many studies, that bank capital ratios 
and several other financial indicators do not serve as 
effectively in emerging market economies as is the case with 
industrial nations. According to Rojas-Suarez (2002), the 
capital-to-asset ratio, has under-performed as an indicator of 
banking crisis related problems in Latin America and Asia 
[18]. Two reasons which have been put forward as 
explanations for this are[19]: 
- Severe deficiencies in the accounting and regulatory 
framework in these jurisdictions; 
- Lack of liquid markets for bank shares, subordinated debt 
and other bank liabilities and assets which are required to 
confirm and justify the actual worth of a bank – rather than 
merely its accounting value. 
To which it will also be added that audits, which serve as 
vital signaling mechanisms in capital markets, have limited 
roles in many emerging economies than is the case with 
industrial nations. However, it needs to be re- called that 
amongst several lessons drawn from the recent Financial 
Crisis, one of the most prominent is namely, the fact that, 
regardless of whether a jurisdiction is an industrial nation or 
emerging economy, capital adequacy measures, on their own, 
no longer suffice as reliable measures or indicators of a 
bank's strength or ability to be resilient – particularly in times 
of crises. 
This, amongst other concerns – relevant to both industrial 
and emerging nations constitutes one of the principal reasons 
for the introduction of Basel III, and more specifically - the 
two liquidity standards, the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) 
and the Net Stable Funding Ration (NSFR), as well as the 
Basel III leverage ratios. 
IV. THE NEED FOR AUDITS AND EXTERNAL AUDITS IN AN 
INCREASINGLY RISK BASED REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
 
Risks have become not only increasingly significant in the 
modern regulatory environment, but also serve as vital 
regulatory tools. Auditors and audits, furthermore, serve as 
fundamental and crucial tools of quantifying risks. As 
highlighted several times, in the literature relating to risk, „in 
order for risks to be quantifiable, they must be auditable“. 
Coupled with the inherent uncertain nature of risks is also the 
quantifiable, as well as unquantifiable aspect and 
characteristic of risk. In this regard, it is important to 
distinguish between risk and uncertainty. Whilst risk is 
traditionally associated with probability calculations – which 
suggests that an event can be predicted and controlled, 
„uncertainty is not capable of measurement and deals with 
possibilities incapable of calculation which are based on 
guesswork and judgment“[20]. 
In assessing whether the current regulatory framework 
appropriately and adequately balances the objectives, as set 
out in paragraph 29 of the Discussion Paper, „The 
Regulatory Framework: Balancing Risk Sensitivity, 
Simplicity and Comparability,“[21]consideration is to be had 
to trade-offs required to find the right balance: Trade offs 
between costs in improving framework in a bid to improve 
complexity, risk sensitivity – at the possible expense of 
simplicity and comparability. 
Is the desire to achieve comparability, as well as 
simplicity, greater than the need to attain accurate, reliable 
and more relevant results through investment in more 
complex techniques? Such techniques involving not only 
initially high outlays but also costs (as well as risks) involved 
in managing such techniques? 
V.   CONCLUSION 
In view of the inconsistencies and unreliability associated 
with relying solely on capital adequacy ratios, measures 
introduced by the Basel Committee, which are designed to 
reduce reliance on a single capital adequacy ratio as the 
primary means of ensuring the soundness of banks, are 
therefore welcomed. As indicated in the discussion paper, 
“The Regulatory Framework: Balancing Risk Sensitivity, 
Simplicity and Comparability“, such measures introduced by 
the Basel Committee, include [22]: 
- The introduction of a leverage ratio 
- An additional capital surcharge for global systemically 
important banks (G-SIBs) 
- A proposed framework for measuring and controlling large 
exposures 
- Minimum liquidity and funding standards 
In support of the comments highlighted by the Committee 
in its discussion paper [23], „risk is indeed multi-faceted and 
far from straight forward to measure“ - and whilst a risk 
sensitive regulatory framework, definitely offers a number of 
benefits, the complexity resulting therefrom bears with it, 
„potentially adverse consequences.“ 
The risk based capital regime should definitely remain at 
the core and focus of the regulatory framework for banks – 
supported by liquidity and funding metrics, as well as other 
measures such as the leverage ratio. Furthermore, core 
principles[24] relating to requirements for coordination and 
cooperation between auditors and supervisors should 
constitute greater binding effects in all jurisdictions and for 
purposes of sovereign credit ratings determination. These 
principles should also be corroborated by provisions, rules 
and regulations which stipulate and require closer working 
relationships between national supervisors, external auditors 
and credit rating agencies. 
Auditors' significance in the supervisory process in 
identifying areas of potential risks have also been 
acknowledged in various sections of the literature [25]. If 
audits are performed as effectively, in the manner in which 
they are expected to be undertaken, then information 
provided by such audits should be credible and reliable. 
Whilst the informational issue with credit agencies appears to 
be the timely processing and transmission of information – a 
feature which depends on effective exchange, coordination 
and communication between those agencies and authorities 
involved, with audits, the crucial issue appears to be the 
credibility of information. 
Audits do not only serve as risk regulatory tools, but also a 
means of verifying information and addressing information 
asymmetries. In this sense, they fulfill a vital position in 
addressing the rationales for financial regulation. 
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